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Notes
JOSE PADILLA: ENEMY COMBATANT OR COMMON CRIMINAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the United States faced an unprecedented
attack against civilians on U.S. soil.' Since the attacks, many scholars have
criticized the government's responses in fighting terrorism, particularly
the detention of Jose Padilla.2 Jose Padilla is an American citizen, yet the
government seized him as he disembarked from a plane at Chicago
O'Hare International Airport and has since held Padilla at a military base
in South Carolina.3 Even more disturbing is the government's argument
that Padilla is an enemy combatant and therefore has no right to a lawyer,
1. See Erica Goode, The Psychology, Attackers Believed to Be Sane, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2001, at A13 (describing events of September 11). For details on the attacks,
see infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
2. SeeJodi Walgreen &Jo Thomas, The Bomb Suspect; From Chicago Gang to Possi-
ble Al Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19 (reporting on arrest and subse-
quent transfer of Jose Padilla to military base). There are numerous legal issues
arising from September l1th, all of which cannot be reviewed in this Note. These
issues include the federal government's power to investigate involvement in terror-
ism, the status of prisoners caught in Afghanistan, the President's power to wage
war, the President's power to require military commissions to try detainees, the
President's power to detain hundreds of people without revealing their identities,
the status of the armed conflict with Afghanistan as a war and, finally, the power of
the President to classify U.S. citizens as enemy combatants and detain them indefi-
nitely. For further reading on these topics, see generally Jeffrey F. Addict, Legal
and Policy Implications for a New Era: The "War on Terror", 4 SCHOLAR 209 (2002)
(discussing whether conflict is war and whether detainees are prisoners of war);
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc Rules of Procedure, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 677 (2002) [hereinafter Paust, Ad Hoc Rules] (discussing constitu-
tionality of military commissions, constitutionality of Presidents Order and jurisdic-
tion of federal courts over Guantanamo Bay); Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery
Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 648 (2002) (discussing problems of President's Order, presidential
power, whether conflict is war and whether detainees are enemy combatants);
Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Military Commissions: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Com-
missions, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 328 (2002) (discussing constitutionality of President's
Order, whether conflict is war, constitutionality of military commissions and
whether Taliban and al-Qaeda are prisoners of war); Christopher M. Evans, Note,
Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to Order the Prosecution of
Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE LJ. 1831 (2002) (discussing Pres-
ident's authority to issue order for military commissions, constitutionality of Presi-
dents Order and whether international law applies).
3. See Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 2, at A19 (describing Padilla's arrest).
In this Note, the use of the word "government" refers to the executive branch,
including the President, his advisors and government agencies acting upon the
President's orders.
(875)
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no right to seek civilian court remedies and no right to have charges
brought against him.
4
Strong governmental reactions to national security emergencies are
not without precedent.5 Nevertheless, it is important for the government
to exercise proper restraint in order to protect the liberties of American
citizens.6 It is a fundamental precept of living in a free society that the
government cannot seize an American and detain him without any
charges brought against him and without a lawyer to protect his rights.
7
4. See id. (describing government's argument for Padilla's detention).
5. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943) (upholding curfew
order of Japanese descendents); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943)
(upholding curfew order ofJapanese descendants); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-
48 (1942) (upholding sentencing and execution of U.S. citizen, tinder military
tribunal); Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1943) (up-
holding internment of citizens of Japanese descent), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297-305 (1944) (holding thatJapanese woman
could not be detained absent evidence of disloyalty); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,
141-42 (1866) (holding military tribunals unconstitutional for trial of civilians dur-
ing peace and when courts were functioning); Scherzberg v. Madeira, 57 F. Supp.
42, 47-48 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (holding that in absence of impending and imminent
danger, Congress could not abridge person's constitutional rights); Schueller v.
Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 387-88 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (holding that there was no rational
basis for exclusion of German citizen from military zone).
6. See Miles Benson & David Woods, In Liberal, Conservative and Military Circles,
Alarm Over Padilla Case, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Washington),June 12, 2002, avail-
able at Lexis, News Group File, All (quoting navy fighter pilot's remarks on possibil-
ity of Americans being taken into custody with no charges and no outside review
saying, "[t] hat's the stuff we fought for, those rights"); Richard Goldstone, Prosecut-
ing Al Qaeda September 11 and its Aftermath, Dec. 7, 2001, at http://
www.crimesofwar.org/expert/al-goldstone.html ("[al-Qaeda] want[s] to destroy
democratic nations, and what better way to do it than to have these [democratic]
nations destroy their own democratic institutions and fundamental principles.");
Andrew Gumbel, Suspect is Being Denied Rights, Say Campaigners, INDEP. (London),
June 12, 2002, at 2 (reporting that American Civil Liberties Union stated, "'[f]or
the United States to maintain its moral authority in the fight against terrorism, its
actions must be implemented in accordance with core American legal and social
values"'); APV Rogers, OBE, Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and its After-
math, Sept. 21, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-apv.html
("States that claim to be civilized must uphold the rule of law.").
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing due process of law); U.S. CoNsrr.
amend. VI (guaranteeing right to counsel). Justice Murphy wrote in a dissent:
The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law applies to "any
person" who is accused of a crime by the Federal Government or any of
its agencies. No exception is made as to those who are accused of war
crimes or as to those who possess the status of enemy belligerent. Indeed,
such an exception would be contrary to the whole philosophy of human
rights which makes the Constitution the great living document that it is.
The immutable rights of the individual, including those secured by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to mem-
bers of those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the
democratic ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or
vanquished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above
any status of belligerency or outlawry. They survive popular passion or
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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This Note considers three questions. First, whether Padilla's deten-
tion is legal. Second, whether the government is accurate in proposing
that they do not have to defend Padilla's detention in a civilian court.
Third, whether there are any legitimate arguments why Padilla should be
subject to different treatment than are other suspected terrorists.
Part II of this Note describes the context of Padilla's detention, in-
cluding measures taken by the President and Congress in response to Sep-
tember l1th, and the particular facts of Padilla's detention.' Part III
reviews the historical grounds for military detention and trial by military
tribunals as well as discussing whether habeas corpus review is available in
those circumstances. 9 Part IV tests Padilla's detention under each of the
historical grounds for detention and asks whether Padilla is entitled to
judicial review."l Part V presents government inconsistencies that lend
credence to the concern that Padilla is being held illegally and questions
whether there are any legitimate reasons to treat Padilla differently in
spite of precedent.'1 This Note concludes that the government's deten-
tion of Jose Padilla is illegitimate under precedent and that, even if Pa-
dilla's detention is legitimate, he at least has the right to challenge his
detention in civilian courts.' 2 Additionally, this Note concludes that the
government's extra-legal arguments do not justify Padilla's inconsistent
treatment.13
frenzy of the moment. No court or legislature or executive, not even the
mightiest army in the world, can ever destroy them. Such is the universal
and indestructible nature of the rights which the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects when life or liberty is
threatened by virtue of the authority of the United States. The existence
of these rights.., cannot be ignored by any branch of Government, even
the military, except tinder the most extreme and urgent circumstances.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing for
primacy of universal rights for all persons and against all branches of government).
8. For a further discussion on Padilla's detention, see infra notes 21-27 and
accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion on the historical grounds for military detentions
and habeas corpus review tinder those circumstances, see infra notes 28-121 and
accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of whether Padilla's detention is legal tinder his-
torical grounds and whether he is entitled tojudicial review, see infra notes 122-76
and accompanying text.
11. For a ftrther discussion of the inconsistent treatment of Padilla in con-
trast to other suspected terrorists and possible explanations for that inconsistent
treatment, see infra notes 177-98 and accompanying text.
12. For a summary of why Padilla's detention is illegal tinder the historical
precedent, see infra notes 125-65 and accompanying text.
13. For a summary of why the government's arguments in favor of military
detention fail, see infra notes 177-98 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Measures Taken by Congress and the President in the Aftermath of
September 1 1 th
On September 11, 2001, members of the terrorist organization al-
Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed them into the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania.14 Immediately, the U.S.
government and the American citizens realized that this was an attack that
required a military response. 15 On September 14, 2001, Congress passed
14. See Serge Schemann, President Vows to Exact Punishment for Evil', N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al (describing events of September 11). American Air-
lines Flight 11, en route to Los Angeles departing from Boston crashed into the
South Tower of the World Trade Center. See id. (same). United Airlines Flight
175, also departing from Boston en route to Los Angeles, crashed into the North
Tower of the World Trade Center. See id. (same). American Airlines Flight 77,
also bound for Los Angeles but departing from Washington Dulles International
Airport, crashed into the Pentagon. See id. (same). Finally, United Airlines Flight
93, flying from Newark en route to San Francisco, crashed in a field in Penn-
sylvania. See id. (same). About an hour after the planes hit the World Trade
Center Towers, they collapsed, burying hundreds of rescue workers along with
thousands of people who worked in the Towers. See id. (same). Al-Qaeda is a
terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden, whose primary goals are to
engage in jihad, or holy war, against the United States and its citizens. See Tor-
ruella, supra note 2, at n.12 (describing al-Qaeda).
15. See Katherine Q. Seelye & Elisabeth Bumiller, The President; Bush Labels
Aerial Terrorists Attacks 'Acts of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A16 (quoting
President Bush saying that attacks "'were more than acts of terror; they were acts of
war"'). Not only did U.S. officials define the attacks as acts of war, but leaders
around the world joined in solidarity with the United States. See Steven Erlanger,
The World's Reaction; European Nations Stand with U.S., Ready to Respond, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at A23 (reporting on reactions from world leaders). German chan-
cellor, Gerhard Schroder, called the attacks "'a declaration of war against the en-
tire civilized world."' Id. (quoting German Chancellor). President Putin of Russia
said: "'Such an inhuman act must not go unpunished ... [t]he entire interna-
tional community should unite in the struggle against terrorism.'" Id. (quoting
Russian President). In a show of international solidarity, the United Nations Se-
curity Council issued resolutions condemning the attacks, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) invoked for the first time Article 5 of its treaty,
stating that an armed attack against America was an attack against all N.A.T.O.
members. See S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4385th mtg., (2001), dvailable
at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2OOl.htm (reaffirming Resolution 1368
and declaring certain measures to combat terrorism); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR,
57th Sess., 4370th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/
sc2001.htm (stating that any act of international terrorism is threat to international
peace and security, and calling on all states to bring to justice terrorists responsible
for attacks); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, 246 (referring to "an armed attack" against one or more members of
N.A.T.O.); N.A.T.O. Press Release, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.
12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1267 (2001) (invoking article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty);
Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001), at http://www.nato.int/docu/
update/2001/1001/el002a.htm (confirming that upon "clear[ ]" determination
of al-Qaeda's responsibility for September 11 attacks, NATO invoked article 5 of
North Atlantic Treaty); see also Suzanne Daley, The Alliance; For First Time, NATO
Invokes Joint Defense Pact with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A17 (reporting on
N.A.T.O. response to September l1th attacks); Robert Goldman, Terrorism and the
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of military force in response to the
terrorist acts. 16 Pursuant to this authorization, U.S. troops began a sus-
tained military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 17 On Novem-
ber 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order (the Order)
authorizing the detention and trial by military commission of all those in-
volved in the terrorist attacks and anyone associated with them.18
Laws of War: September 11 and Its Aftermath, Sept. 21, 2001, at http://
www.crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-gold.html (pointing out significance of
United Nations Security Council and N.A.T.O. statements); Serge Schemann, Meet-
ings; U.N. Delays General Assembly Session of World Leaders Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2001, at B6 (reporting on United Nations Security Council's resolution con-
demning terrorism); Serge Schemann, Resolution; U.N. Requires Members to Act
Against Terror N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at Al (reporting on United Nations Se-
curity Council resolution authorizing use of force).
16. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter Joint Resolution] (atithoriz-
ing President to take all measures in combating terrorism, including force).
17. See David Rohde, Thunderous Blasts and Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al (reporting that air strikes had begun over Afghan
city of Kabul). The Taliban is a fundamentalist Islamic group who assumed con-
trol of Afghanistan in the early 1990s. See Torruella, supra note 2, at 693 (describ-
ing how Taliban government's history bolsters argument that members of Taliban
are subject to President Bush's military order). The Taliban received recognition
only from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. See id. (stating that Taliban's lack of diplo-
matic recognition supports view that members of Taliban are terrorists within mili-
tary order's definition).
18. See Military Order (the Order) of November 13, 2001, Title 3, The Presi-
dent, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (authorizing detention of non-
citizens found to have participated in terrorist acts or associated with members of
al-Qaeda, and authorizing trial by military commission). This Order subjects those
who are non-U.S. citizens and who have either been a member of al-Qaeda, en-
gaged in or have in their aim to engage in acts of terrorism, or harbored any of the
above, to detention pursuant to the Order and to trial by military commissions. See
id. § 2(a)(1)(i-iii) (defining jurisdiction of military order as limited to non-U.S.
citizens). The Order also denies individuals falling within this Order any remedy
in any other courts. See id. § 7(b)(2) (removing privilege to seek remedies, not
only in U.S courts but in foreign courts and international tribunals). Although the
Order seems to suspend the privilege to seek a writ of habeas corpus, White House
Counsel Alberto Gonzalez has said that a writ of habeas corpus would be allowed.
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at
A27 (stating that anyone detained tinder military order would not be denied op-
portunity to challenge lawfulness of commission's jurisdiction in federal court).
To date, hundreds of foreigners captured in Afghanistan, mostly of Arab descent,
have been detained on military bases outside the U.S. pursuant to the Order. See
Katherine Q. Seelye, Prisoners; U.S. Treatment of War Captives Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2002, at A12 (reporting detention of almost 300 prisoners at U.S. Naval
base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Commentators and scholars have hotly debated
the constitutionality of the use of military commissions. Compare Curtis A. Bradley
&Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Militay Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG
2D 249, 249-55 (2002) (defending constitutional validity of military commissions),
and Torruella, supra note 2, at 653-85, 710-24 (discussing underlying power to exe-
cute order and policy consideration needed to implement it), and Wedgwood,
supra note 2, at 330-35 (supporting use of military commissions but advocating
policy considerations for their implementation), with George P. Fletcher, War and
5
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Problems applying the Order arose during the subsequent discovery that
two of the captured Taliban were American citizens, a significant fact due
to the Order's express exclusion of American citizens from its jurisdic-
tion. 19 Although other suspected terrorists have been arrested since Sep-
the Constitution: Bush's Military Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, AM.
PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at 26, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/
1/fletcher-g.html (condemning all military tribunals of modern period as viola-
tions of Geneva Convention), andJordan j. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions:
Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-4 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Courting
Illegality] (criticizing President Bush's military order), andJennifer Trahan, Trying
Bin Laden and Others: Evaluating the Options for Terrorist Trials, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L.
475, 496-507 (2002) (advocating trials for terrorists in federal courts or interna-
tional tribunals rather than military commissions), and Evans, supra note 2, at
1855-56 (concluding that President's military order is constitutional but inconsis-
tent with international law).
19. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Title 3, Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,833, § 2(a) (Nov. 16, 2001) (referring only non-citizens to Order's jurisdiction).
The two captured men, John Walker Lindh and Yasir Hamdi, were transferred
from detention in Afghanistan and Cuba respectively, to detention in the United
States. See Evelyn Nieves, A U.S. Covert's Path from Suburbia to a Gory Jail for Taliban,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at BI (reporting Lindh's background and path to involve-
ment with al-Qaeda); Katherine Q. Seelye, The American Prisoner: Walker Is Returned
to U.S. and Will Be in Court Today, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A15 [hereinafter
Seelye, Walker Is Returned] (describing Lindh's return to United States and charges
facing him); Katharine Q. Seelye, Prisoners; Believed to Be a U.S. Citizen, Detainee Is
Jailed in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A7 [hereinafter Seelye, Detainee Is
Jailed] (reporting that Yasir Hamdi was transferred to detention in U.S. after dis-
covery of his U.S. citizenship). Lindh was charged with conspiring to kill Ameri-
cans and supporting terrorist groups. See David Johnston, Walker Will Face Terrorism
Counts in a Civilian Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al (reporting charges
against Lindh and Lindh's background with Taliban). Lindh's case ended with a
plea-bargain, in which Lindh agreed to cooperate with investigators in return for a
reduced sentence of twenty years in prison. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Regretful Lindh
Gets 20 Years in Taliban Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Seelye,
Regretful Lindh] (reporting on final sentencing of Lindh to twenty years in prison
under plea agreement); 20-Year Sentence Recommended for Lindh, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2002, at AIl (reporting on Lindh's plea-bargain and Justice Department's rec-
ommendation of twenty year sentence). In contrast, Hamdi has been held at a
military base without any access to the outside, including access to a lawyer. See
Katherine Q. Seelye, U.S. Argues War Detainee Shouldn't See a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2002, at AlO [hereinafter Seelye, U.S. Argues] (reporting on government's
position in denying Hamdi access to counsel). Unlike Lindh, Hamdi has not been
charged with a crime. See id. (reporting on government's arguments for detaining
Hamdi). The government argues that Hamdi is an enemy combatant and can
therefore be held by the military, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions,
until the current hostilities have ended. See Marcia Coyle, Taking Offense Wrestling
with Court Access for Captured Citizens, NAT'L L:J., July 29, 2002, at Al (reporting on
grounds government gives for justification of detention). If Haindi indeed fought
with the Taliban and was captured on the battlefield, his U.S. citizenship likely
would not bar his detention in a manner similar to other detainees. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1942) (holding that U.S. citizens fighting for enemy
were subject to same treatment as non-citizens). It is troubling, however, that
Lindh, caught in similar circumstances, received his full constitutional rights, yet
Hamdi has not. See Seelye, Regretful Lindh, supra, at Al (reporting Lindh's plea-
bargain). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overruled a
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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tember 11th, in May 2002, the government made its most controversial
arrest, that of Jose Padilla.
20
district court judge's order to supply Hamdi with public counsel. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that district court judge did
not properly give deference to executive branch's findings). Nevertheless, the
court stopped short of agreeing with the government's argument that the court
had no right to review Hamdi's detention at all, stating that "[iun dismissing, we
ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping proposition-namely that,
with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy
combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the gov-
ernment's say-so." Id. at 283. The case was remanded to the district court judge,
who ordered the government to submit evidence to him justifying Hamdi's classifi-
cation as an enemy combatant and his detention. See Deadline for Explanation, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A15 (reporting that government lawyers have one week to
explain enemy combatant designation); Government Ordered toJustifyJailing of a Cap-
tured American, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at A8 (reporting that district courtjudge
ordered government to present documents supporting designation of enemy com-
batant status). The government defied those orders and the district court judge
allowed the government to appeal his order to the court of appeals. See Katherine
Q. Seelye, Judge Suspends Proceedings in Standoff on War Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2002, at A22 [hereinafter Seelye, Judge Suspends Proceedings] (reporting that judge
suspended proceedings after government refused to turn over documents). The
court of appeals has since upheld Hamdi's detention, focusing largely on the nar-
row factual circumstances of his capture on the battlefield. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 198 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003). For continued updates on this
case, see http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2003) (cataloging all court proceedings in current terrorism-
related cases).
20. See Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 2, at A19 (reporting on Padilla's ar-
rest). In asking whether Padilla's detention is legal, it is of interest to point out
that two non-citizens have been arrested for terrorist activities and are proceeding
through the federal court system. See U.S. Circumvents Courts with Enemy Combatant
Tag, Human Rights Watch (New York), June 12, 2002, at http://www.hrw.org/
press/2002/06/us0612.htm (last visited July 12, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch] (pointing out discrepancy between so-called twentieth hijacker, Zacarias
Moussaoui, and Padilla). The first man is Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
arrested for visa violations prior to September 11 and who is widely believed to be
the twentieth hijacker. See David Johnston, Not-Guilty Plea Is Set for Man in Terror
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al (reviewing background of Moussaoui's arrest
and charges against him). Moussaoui is also defending himself in federal court.
See Philip Shenon, Sept. 11 Defendant Who Wants to Represent Himself ls Busy Doing So,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at A22 [hereinafter Shenon, Sept. 11] (describing Mous-
saoui's numerous court filings). The second man is Richard Reid, also known as
"the shoe bomber," a British citizen arrested after attempting to ignite an explosive
hidden in his shoe during a trans-Atlantic flight in December 2001. See Alan Cow-
ell, Shoe Bomb Suspect; Reports Narrow Down Movement of Man with Plastic Explosive,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B5 (reporting on Reid's activities prior to boarding
flight); Cathy Booth Thomas, Courage in the Air, TIME, Sept. 11, 2002, at 108
(describing events of Richard Reid's attempted attack). There is significant evi-
dence linking both of these men to al-Qaeda. SeeJohnston, supra, at Al (reporting
on evidence against Moussaoui); Thomas, supra, at 108 (reporting on evidenc:,,
against Reid). Additionally, other groups of suspected terrorists have been ar-
rested and charged in separate instances. See Eric Lichtblau, Four in U.S. Charged in
Post-9/11 Plan to Join Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al (reporting that four
U.S. citizens were arrested in Oregon and charged with conspiring to provide ma-
terial support and services to al-Qaeda and Taliban); Philip Shenon, U.S. Says Sus-
7
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B. Jose Padilla's Plight
On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, was
arrested at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. 21 The government sus-
pects that Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was plotting a "dirty bomb" attack on the
United States. 22 On June 9, 2002, the government transferred Padilla to
detention at a military base in Virginia pursuant to an order by the Presi-
dent.23 Padilla was neither charged with a crime nor allowed access to a
lawyer. 2
4
The government argues that Padilla is an enemy combatant and
therefore subject to detention by the military until hostilities end. 25 Fur-
thermore, the government has openly admitted that it has no interest in
pects in New York Went to Afghan Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at I [hereinafter
Shenon, U.S. Says] (describing arrest of five U.S. citizens of Yemeni descent for
suspected links to al-Qaeda).
21. See Anthony Dworkin, Detention of U.S. Citizen May Open Anti-Terrorism Cam-
paign to Legal Scrutiny, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-al-
muhajir.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (describing facts surrounding Padilla's
arrest); see also Lev Grossman, The Accidental Advocate, TIME, Sept. 9, 2002, at 96
(describing facts of Padilla's arrest and overview of legal battle); Wilgoren &
Thomas, supra note 2, at A19 (reporting on arrest and subsequent transfer to mili-
tary detention of Jose Padilla). Jose Padilla was born in New York and spent most
of his childhood growing up in Chicago, where he was a member of a gang. See id.
(describing Padilla's childhood). Padilla was arrested on May 8, 2002, on a mate-
rial witness warrant at Chicago O'Hare International Airport and was then trans-
ferred to the military brig. See id. (describing Padilla's arrest).
22. See Tom Brune et al., Arrest in Terror Plot; Feds: American, al-Qaeda Sought to
Set Off 'Dirty Bomb'in U.S., NEWSDAY (NewYork), June 11, 2002, at A5 (reporting on
why Padilla was transferred to military base); Bush Calls Accused Plotter 'Would-Be
Killer,' Lawyer Says Rights Violated, GUELPH MERCURY (Toronto), June 12, 2002, at
A10 [hereinafter Bush Calls] (stating that Padilla is suspected of planning to acti-
vate radioactive weapon). According to government sources, a detained al-Qaeda
leader, Abu Zubaydah, informed American officials that Padilla had a plan to
detonate a dirty bomb. See Benjamin Weiser & Dana Canedy, Lawyer Plans Chal-
lenge to Detention of Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A24 (discussing evidence
leading to Padilla's arrest). It is generally acknowledged, however, that Padilla did
not have the means to carry out any such plot and that there is no evidence that
the plot even reached the initial planning stage. See id. (discussing status of plans
to detonate dirty bomb). A "dirty bomb" or radioactive bomb is "a conventional
explosive device containing radioactive material toxic to humans that can be fatal
to people in the vicinity of the blast. It is also seen as an effective weapon for
disseminating panic." Lawyer Says 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect's Detention Unconstitutional,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (New York), June 11, 2002, at Lexis, News Group File, All
(describing possible effects of "dirty bomb").
23. See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (discussing facts of Padilla's
detention).
24. See Benson & Woods, supra note 6, at Lexis, Newsgroup File, All (stating
lack of formal charges against Padilla); Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 2, at A19
(listing rights that may have been violated).
25. See Benson & Woods, supra note 6, at Lexis, Newsgroup File, All (report-
ing that government is holding Padilla as enemy combatant under principles of
Geneva Convention). The government is relying on a 1942 Supreme Court case as
precedent for the military detention of Padilla. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-
48 (1942) (upholding use of military tribunals for captured German saboteurs); see
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charging or punishing him and only wants him for information pur-
poses. 26 Donna Newman, a lawyer previously appointed to represent Pa-
dilla while he was detained as a material witness, has filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus seeking Padilla's release.2 7 In order to determine
whose argument is strongest, it is best to examine historical precedent.
III. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE USE OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
MILITARY DETENTIONS
Historically, military detentions and trials have replaced civilian courts
in the following circumstances: (1) during the existence of martial law; 28
also Adam Liptak, Questions on U.S. Action in Bomb Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002,
at A18 (addressing legal problems with Padilla's military detention).
26. See Dworkin, supra note 21 (quoting interview with Donald Rumsfeld). In
the interview, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, "[w]e are not inter-
ested in trying him at the moment; we are not interested in punishing him at the
moment. We are interested in finding out what he knows." Id. (quoting Donald
Rumsfeld admitting government does not want to try Padilla). Prior to Padilla's
designation as an enemy combatant, Padilla was being held as a material witness.
See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (describing facts of Padilla's arrest and
progress of case in courts). In April of 2002, a federal judge in the district court
for the Southern District of New York ruled that detaining material witnesses for
grand jury investigations was illegal. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp.
2d 55, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that people could not be held indefinitely for
purpose of grand jury investigations). But see Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge Clears
Detention of Witnesses for Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at B4 (reporting that
judge on same court decided that prosecutors may detain witnesses to testify in
grand juries, in contradiction of Awadallah decision).
27. See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (explaining status of case with
respect to federal courts). Most recently, Judge Michael Mukasey in a federal dis-
trict court in New York has allowed lawyers to meet with Padilla solely to enable
him to present his petition, and will likely decide on the merits of the case in 2003,
at which point it will likely proceed up through the federal court system. See Pa-
dilla v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002) (holding that
Padilla may consult with attorneys regarding his petition). For current develop-
ments in this case, see http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/
index.html (last visitedJan. 13, 2003) (cataloging developments in Padilla case and
other terrorism-related cases).
28. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1909) (upholding establish-
ment of military tribunals); State ex rel. O'Connor v. Dist. Court in Shelby County,
260 N.W. 73, 84-85 (Iowa 1935) (upholding existence of martial law); In re McDon-
ald, 143 P. 947, 954-55 (Mont. 1914) (holding that, during martial law, military
may arrest and detain people but may not punish them); see also 53A AM. JUR. 2D
Military and Civil Defense §§ 43746 (2d ed. 2002) (describing generally jurisdiction
of military over civilians during martial law). The scope of martial law is as follows:
Martial law ... presupposes the existence of a state of actual war and the
occupation of the district where it exists by a hostile or lawless force inter-
rupting the civil courts in the administration of law in their accustomed
mode. Martial law can only exist and military power can only be exer-
cised over the property of the citizen when the civil arm of the govern-
ment becomes powerless because of invasion, insurrection, or anarchy. It
does not arise from threatened invasion; the necessity must be actual and
present and the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
deposes the civil administration. It can never exist where the courts are
open and in the proper and uninterrupted exercise of their jurisdiction.
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(2) in occupied territories; 29 and (3) to detain enemy combatants during
hostilities and try those who violate the law of war.30 Additionally, from
Id. § 438. Nevertheless, there is limited application to civilians:
While ... martial law supersedes all civil authority during the period, and
within the territorial limits, of its operation, the power of the military
under martial law over persons not in the military service is limited by the
reasonable necessities of the occasion, and this is true even where the
term "martial law" is used in its strict sense. The same rule applies where
a modified form of martial law is declared in cases of internal insurrec-
tion or disorder, which is beyond the power of the civil authorities to
quell.
Id. § 442. Under martial law, the military has power to arrest and detain civilians
in certain circumstances. See id. § 445 ("It is the general rule that the military
authorities, in the enforcement of martial law, may cause the arrest and detention
of civilians when such action appears to be necessary for the restoration or mainte-
nance of public order or the protection of persons or property against unlawful
acts."). These cases must be distinguished from the system of courts-martial, which
is the justice system in place within the military to try and punish its own members.
See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2002) [herein-
after U.C.MJ.] (providing guidelines for justice system within military); see also 53A
Am. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense §§ 250-354 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing mili-
tary law).
29. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361-62 (1952) (upholding estab-
lishment of occupation court in Germany to try civilians for crimes under German
Criminal Code); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1909) (holding that
because civil courts had not yet extended into occupied territory, military power
warranted creation of provisional court); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. 129, 129-31
(1869) (holding that President could establish temporary provisional court to try
cases during war); see also 78 Am. JUR. 2D War § 127 (2d ed. 2002) (describing
establishment of courts ofjustice in occupied territory).
30. See In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1946) (upholding sentence by mili-
tary tribunal of General Yamashita for war crimes); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47-48 (up-
holding military trial of enemy entering U.S. territory to commit sabotage); see also
53A Am. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 255 (2d ed. 2002) (describing aspect of
customary international law allowing military commissions to try prisoners of war
for violations of law of war). In general, the law of war is an unwritten body of law
that has developed over centuries to create a common law of war that governs the
behavior of soldiers and civilians in times of war. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47-48
(discussing applicable section of Articles of War). Today there are numerous trea-
ties that clearly set out the rules and obligations by which soldiers must conduct
themselves during war. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force generally Oct. 21, 1950, entered
into force with respect to United States Feb. 2, 1956) (providing for humane treat-
ment of those wounded on battlefield); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
generally Oct. 21, 1950, entered into force with respect to United States Feb. 2,
1956) (providing for humane treatment of those wounded during war); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force generally Oct. 21, 1950, entered into
force with respect to United States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter, Geneva-Prisoners of
War] (regulating capture of enemy forces and defining prisoners of war); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force generally Oct. 21, 1950,
entered into force with respect to United States Feb. 2, 1956) (regulating treat-
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/4
2003] NOTE 885
time to time, the President, acting via congressional authorization or os-
tensibly under his own power as Commander-in-Chief, has ordered the
military detention of certain individuals or classes of individuals.3 As a
secondary matter, the representative cases also demonstrate that the civil-
ian courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of these detentions
via a writ of habeas corpus. 32
The government justifies Padilla's detention by arguing that, because
he is an enemy combatant, he has no right to a lawyer and can be held
without charges. "t3 Additionally, the government insists that the Presi-
ment of civilians by armed forces during war). In the notes to section 821 of the
U.C.M.J., law of war is defined as "[including] at least that part of [the] law of
nations which defines powers and duties of belligerent powers occupying enemy
territory pending establishment of civil government." See U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C.
§ 821, n.1 (citing Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952)).
31. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943) (upholding
validity of curfew order limiting movement of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent
under President's war powers); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943)
(stating validity of curfew order applicable to U.S. citizens of Japanese descent
under President's broad power to wage war under constitution); Korematsu v.
United States, 140 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1943) (upholding evacuation order ap-
plicable to U.S. citizens ofJapanese descent because U.S. government has power to
do all that is necessary in prosecuting war), aff'd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). But seeEx
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944) (holding invalid detention of woman of
Japanese descent because, in absence of disloyalty, she posed no threat of sabotage
or espionage and therefore her detention was not related to any reasonable objec-
tive); Scherzberg v. Madeira, 57 F. Stipp. 42, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (condemning
abridgement of person's rights and liberties in absence of situation fraught with
impending and imminent danger); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 387 (E.D.
Pa. 1943) ("Direct interference with liberty and property and abridgement of con-
stitutional guaranties of freedom can be justified tinder the 'war power' only where
the danger to the government is real, impending and imminent.").
32. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8 (noting that Court's job was to consider legal-
ity of military commission); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27 (rejecting argument that Court
could not decide whether military commissions overstepped constitutional bound-
aries); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 33 (1866) (holding that Court would always
have jurisdiction to determine whether those individuals subject to military trial
were legally detained). See generally George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty over
Habeas Corpus and the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 397 (2002)
(surveying granting of habeas corpus review in situations of detention by military
tribunal). For a fuller discussion of habeas corpus in general, see 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies §§ 1-226 (2d ed. 2002) (providing over-
view of habeas corpus). It is important to note, but beyond the scope of this Note
to explore in detail, that military detentions and tribunals have always been sup-
ported by authorization from the President, Congress or military commanders in
the field. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 18 (surveying use and au-
thorization of military commissions in history). For the purposes of this Note, it is
assumed that, in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan, the President has the
power to authorize military commissions to try those captured on the battlefield.
For opposing opinions, see supra note 18.
33. See Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 2, at A19 (describing government's
argument for Padilla's detention).
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dent's power to detain someone during war in the name of national secur-
ity is not challengeable 3 4 Nevertheless, limits have been imposed.1
5
A. Enemy Combatants and Violations of the Law of War
Under international law, members of opposing forces may be held in
military detention until the cessation of the armed conflict.3 6 After World
War II, the use of congressionally authorized military tribunals was wide-
spread in the trials of enemy combatants who violated the law of war. 37 In
34. See Grossman, supra note 21, at 96 (quoting U.S. government brief in Pa-
dilla's case stating, "'A court of the United States has no jurisdiction ... to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties'").
35. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 301-02 (holding that detention of woman ofJapanese
descent was not related to reasonable objective of preventing sabotage and espio-
nage); Schenmberg, 57 F. Supp. at 47 (holding that German born citizens' detention
was illegal because no rational basis for exclusion order existed); Schueller, 51 F.
Supp. at 387 (holding that neither President nor Congress may abridge person's
freedom in absence of impending and imminent danger).
36. See Geneva-Prisoners of War, supra note 30, art. 118 (providing for repatri-
ation of prisoners of war at end of hostilities). It is beyond the scope of this Note
to delve into the complexities of international law regarding the eligibility of ter-
rorists for prisoner of war status. It is sufficient to note that in armed conflicts, one
side may detain captured enemies and hold them until the end of hostilities. See
id. (discussing detention of captured enemies). The Treaty of Versailles, signed
after the First World War, recognized the right of the Allies "to bring before mili-
tary tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws
and customs of war." Treaty of Peace with Germany, art. 228, reprinted in 13 Am. J.
INT'L L. 151, 250-51 (Supp. 1919) (authorizing use of military tribunals). For op-
posing views on whether terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda, should be ac-
corded prisoner of war (POW) status, compare Marc Cogen, Terrorism and the Laws
of War: September 11 and its Aftermath, Nov. 7, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/
expert/attack-cogen.html (arguing that terrorists are not privileged combatants
and are not entitled to prisoner of war status because they act independently of
states), and Michael Noone, POWs or Unlawful Combatants? September 1l and its After-
math, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/pow-noone.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2002) (agreeing with administration that al-Qaeda are not POWs because they do
not satisfy conditions under Geneva Conventions), with Curtis Doebbler, POWs or
Unlawful Combatants? September 11 and its Aftermath, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/
expert/pow-doebbler.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (arguing that until tribunal
declares otherwise, those captured in Afghanistan are POWs), and H. Wayne Elli-
ott, POWs or Unlawful Combatants? September 11 and its Aftermath, at http://
www.crinesofwar.org/expert/pow-elliott.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (arguing
that members of al-Qaeda caught in Afghanistan are POWs because of their rela-
tionship with Taliban army), and Robert Goldman, POWs or Unlawful Combatants?
September 11 and its Aftermath, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/pow-
goldman.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (distinguishing between members of al-
Qaeda caught in Afghanistan, who are considered POWs and those captured in
third world countries, who act individually and are therefore common criminals).
37. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5 (subjecting General Yamashita to trial by mili-
tary tribunal for violations of law of war in Philippines). The Constitution autho-
rizes Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress has power to "define and punish ... offences
against the Law of Nations"). The law of nations is international law, including
treaties and customary international law. See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOvES, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 1 (2d ed. 2001) (describing origin of
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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both In re Yamashita38 and Ex pane Quirin,39 the Supreme Court consid-
ered petitions for a writ of habeas corpus from individuals who were tried
and sentenced to death by congressionally authorized military tribunals.
40
In both cases, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the tribunals, but pro-
tected the Court's role to inquire into the constitutionality of each
detention.
4
'
In Yamashita, the Court considered a writ of habeas corpus filed on
behalf of General Yamashita, the Commanding General for the Imperial
Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands during World War I. 4 2 The mili-
tary commission found General Yamashita guilty of violating the law of war
and sentenced him to death.43 Yamashita filed a petition for habeas
corpus, arguing that the military commission did not have jurisdiction to
try him.
44
international law). Customary international law is the international custom devel-
oped by state practice such that there is a sense of legal obligation, or opiniojuris,
to act according to those customs. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
757, 757 (2001) (defining customary international law as having elements of state
practice and opiniojuris, or sense of legal obligation). The Articles of War, now
codified in the U.C.M.J., not only recognize military commissions as the appropri-
ate forums to try offenses against the law of war, but also authorize the President to
prescribe the procedure for military commissions in dealing with those charged of
relieving, harboring or corresponding with the enemy. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-
27 (listing Congressionally authorized articles for use of military commissions); see
also 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2002) (authorizing President to prescribe rules for cases tria-
ble in military commissions or tribunals); 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2002) (recognizing con-
current jurisdiction between courts-martial and military commissions for violations
of law of war). Not only may the President establish military commissions, but a
field commander, or any other commander with the power to convene a general
court-martial, has the authority to appoint a military commission to try a prisoner
of war for alleged violations of laws of war committed within the area of his com-
mand. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9-11. For a discussion on the law of war, see supra
note 30.
38. 327 U.S. at 1 (1946).
39. 317 U.S. at 1 (1942). It should be noted that the Bush administration
cites primarily to this source to defend its detention of Jose Padilla. See Laurence
H. Tribe, Citizens, Combatants and the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 13
(rebutting U.S. argument that World War II cases justify Padilla's detention by
noting that "these decisions arose only because the federal courts were considering
the constitutional claims of the detainees in the first place").
40. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13-14 (summarizing charges against General
Yamashita); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-21 (describing circumstances of soldiers' arrest);
see also In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding that military tribu-
nal had jurisdiction over U.S. citizen captured while fighting with Italian army).
For a discussion of the law of war, see supra note 30.
41. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8-9 (stating that Court could determine whether
trial was illegal); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (rejecting argument that Court had no
jurisdiction to evaluate whether military trial of petitioners was beyond constitu-
tional boundaries).
42. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5 (discussing facts of case).
43. See id. (reviewing procedural history of case). For a discussion on the law
of war, see supra note 30.
44. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5-6 (describing Yamashita's claims).
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The Court pointed to Congress's constitutional power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations and its ability to grant military
commissions jurisdiction to try these offenses. 4"5 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the commission had jurisdiction to try Yamashita. 4  Neverthe-
less, it is important to note that the Court considered Yamashita's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, despite the fact that he was an enemy alien
captured outside the jurisdictional territory of the U.S. courts. 47 The
Court explained that its job was not to assess guilt or innocence but only to
consider the legality of the commission. 48
In Ex pane Quiin,49 a group of German soldiers, one of whom was a
U.S. citizen, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after being tried and
sentenced by a military tribunal.5 ) The petitioners had entered the U.S.
via submarine, discarded their uniforms and proceeded to their respective
tasks assigned by the German government.5' They were captured carrying
explosives, fuses, timing devices and large sums of U.S. currency. 52 A se-
ries of presidential proclamations appointed military commissions to try
the petitioners for offenses against the law of war; these proclamations also
declared who would be subject to the commissions.5 3
45. See id. at 7 (reviewing jurisdiction of military commissions over violations
of law of war). For a discussion on the law of war, see supra note 30. For a discus-
sion on the jurisdiction of' military commissions, see supra note 37.
46. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 25 (stating conclusion).
47. See id. at 8-9 (stating that Congress, by sanctioning trials of enemy aliens
by military commission, had not foreclosed their right to challenge authority of
trial tinder Constitution). For an argument that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
in Cuba are under thejjurisdiction of the United States and should receive consti-
tutional rights, see Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 18, at 24-25 (stating that U.S.
military base is part of U.S. jurisdiction under international law); Paust, Ad Hoc
Rules, supra note 2, at 690-91 (stating that U.S. court decision denying habeas
corpus review to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba is violation of interna-
tional law); Torruella, supra note 2, at 704-05 (stating that United States has sover-
eign power over base and has previously exercised criminal jurisdiction over
citizens and aliens on base). For a discussion of cases that deny jurisdiction to
aliens outside of U.S. territory, see infira note 168.
48. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8 (describing relevant issues of case); see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 451-52 (2002) (stating that purpose of writ of habeas corpus was to in-
quire into cause of restraint of liberty). The Court felt strongly that enemy aliens
accused of offenses in military commissions should retain the right to challenge
their detention on constitutional grounds. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9 (noting that
executive branch could not prevent courts from making inquiry into authority of
military commission).
49. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
50. See id. at 18-23 (describing facts and procedural history of case).
51. See id. at 21-22 (describing facts of case).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 22-23 (reviewing executive actions that provided jurisdiction for
military commission to try petitioners). The President's proclamation stated:
[A] II persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war
with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direc-
tion of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to
enter the United States . . . through coastal or boundary defenses, and
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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The government challenged the petition, stating that petitioners were
denied access to the courts because they were enemy belligerents and be-
cause the President's proclamation expressly denied them access. 54 The
Court rejected this argument stating, "neither the Proclamation nor the
fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of
petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United
States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military comnission."
55
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that it would give substantial defer-
ence to the executive's decisions.
-6
In determining whether the petitioners in fact violated the law of war,
the Court drew an important distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants. 57 Unlawful combatants, unlike lawful combatants, were sub-
ject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for the acts that rendered
them unlawful combatants, namely violations of the law of war.58 The
Court stated, "those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from en-
are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabo-
tage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war,
shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.
Id.
54. See id. at 24 (addressing government's argument that Court could not
hear case).
55. Id. at 25.
56. See id. (stating that Court would not set aside detention and trial of peti-
tioners "without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution
or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted"). The Court's reason for this defer-
ence was the constitutional grants of power to both the President and Congress in
relation to armed conflict. See id. at 26 (reviewing Constitution for evidence of
Congressional and Executive power); see also U.S. CONsF". art. I, § 8, cl. I (giving
Congress power to provide for common defense); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10
(giving Congress authority to "define and punish ... [o]ffences against the Law of
Nations"); U.S. CONs'r. art. I, § 8, cl. I (giving Congress authority to "declare
War ... and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"); U.S. CoNs-r.
art. I1, § 2, cl. I (making President Commander in Chief of Army and Navy);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (holding
that President has exclusive power in international affairs, and courts must accord
higher degree of deference to this power). For a discussion on how Congress has
implemented some of its Constitutional powers in defining offenses against the law
of nations, see supra note 37. For a discussion of the law of war, see sula note 30.
57. See Quiin, 317 U.S. at 30-31 (distinguishing unlawful combatants from
lawful combatants).
58. See id. at 31 (defining unlawful combatant). The Court defined unlawful
combatants, stating:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and
communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uni-
form comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who
are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war,
but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals.
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emy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have
the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commis-
sion." 591 The Court found that the petitioners' actions had indeed violated
the law of war.
60
The Court next considered one petitioner's argument that his U.S.
citizenship protected him from designation as an unlawful combatant and
from the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 6 1 The Court held that U.S.
citizenship did not relieve a person of the consequences of his actions as
an enemy belligerent stating, "[c] itizens who associate themselves with the
military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war."62 Thus,
a U.S. citizen was subject to the military commissions by virtue of his un-
lawful combatant status with the enemy. 63
As these cases demonstrate, the military has jurisdiction over anyone,
including a U.S. citizen, who fights for or acts on behalf of the enemy.
64
The military can detain these belligerents until the cessation of the hostili-
ties and try those who violate the law of war in military commissions and
tribunals. 65 These cases also demonstrate that, notwithstanding the law-
fulness of these detentions, each individual may challenge his detention
before a civilian court.6 6
B. Presidential and Congressional Power to Order the Detention of Civilians
The President may not unilaterally order the arrest of a citizen in the
absence of martial law, military occupation or imprisonment of enemy
59. Id. at 35.
60. See id. at 36-37 (finding that petitioner's actions met definitions of unlaw-
ful combatants). The fact that the petitioner had not actually committed or at-
tempted to commit the proposed act or entered a zone of active military
operations did not diminish the petitioner's status as an enemy belligerent. See id.
at 37 (stating that there was no necessity for completed acts). For a discussion of
the law of war, see supra note 30.
61. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (discussing whether U.S. citizenship ex-
empted prisoner from designation as unlawful combatant or relieved him from
military commission's jurisdiction).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 48 (holding that military commission was lawful).
64. See id. at 37-38 (defining enemy belligerents).
65. See, e.g., In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1946) (upholding sentence by
military tribunal of General Yamashita for war crimes); Quirnn, 317 U.S. at 48 (up-
holding military trials of enemies entering U.S. territory to commit sabotage). For
a discussion of the law of war, see supra note 30.
66. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8-9 (stating that Court could determine whether
trial was illegal); Quiin, 317 U.S. at 25 (rejecting argument that Court had no
jurisdiction to evaluate whether military trial of petitioners was beyond constitu-
tional boundaries).
890
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combatants during war. 67 One of the basic tenets of the Constitution is
that no branch of government may detain, arrest or imprison a person
without basic guarantees, such as the right to counsel, the right to a trial
and the right of due process.68 World War II severely tested these princi-
ples, however, when numerous congressionally authorized presidential
proclamations ordered the relocation of citizens and non-citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry to internment camps. 6 9 Although the courts upheld most of
these orders, some limits were later set.
70
1. General Principals of the Government's Power to Detain Civilians
Three important cases set general limits on presidential power to or-
der the detention of individuals by the military. 7 1 In Ex pare Milligan,72
the Supreme Court struck down the sentence of a civilian, finding that a
military commission did not have jurisdiction to try him because he was
not a member of the armed forces, had not fought in the rebellion and
because the courts were open and unobstructed. 73 In Ex pare Orozco,7 4 a
Texas district court held that the President could not detain a civilian with-
67. SeeExparteOrozco, 201 F. 106, 118 (W.D. Tex. 1912) (holding that Presi-
dent could not detain citizen without granting due process of law).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing due process of law); U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (guaranteeing right to counsel).
69. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943) (upholding
validity of President's curfew order limiting movement of U.S. citizens of.Japanese
descent); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943) (same); Korematsu v.
United States, 140 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1943) (upholding validity of President's
relocation order forcing internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent in
camps), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
70. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944) (requiring showing of dis-
loyalty to justify detention of woman of Japanese descent as relating to proper
objective of protecting U.S. from sabotage and espionage); Scherzberg v. Madeira,
57 F. Supp. 42, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (requiring evidence of actual activities related to
espionage and actual impending danger in general area to justify detention of
German-born U.S. citizen); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 387 (E.D. Pa.
1943) (requiring immediate and impending danger and inability of civilian au-
thorities to secure public safety to justify exclusion order that abridges person's
liberties and freedoms).
71. See Duncan v. Kahanamoko, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (holding that citi-
zen of Hawaii could not be tried by military commission as long as civilian courts
were functioning); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 131 (1866) (holding that military
had nojurisdiction over civilians when courts were open and functioning); Ex parte
Orozco, 201 F. 106, 118 (W.D. Tex. 1912) (holding that President could not arrest
someone without granting them their constitutional rights); see also Ex parte
Lavinder, 108 S.E. 428, 431 (W. Va. 1921) (holding that civilian could not be de-
tained by military unless there was actual and present war);Johnson v.Jones, 44 111.
142, 164 (Il. 1867) (holding that civilian could not be detained by military when
courts were open).
72. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
73. See id. at 130 (stating that Milligan's trial and conviction were illegal).
74. 201 F. 106 (W.D. Tex. 1912).
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out granting him his constitutional rights.7 5  Finally, in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku,76 the Supreme Court held that the military could not exer-
cise jurisdiction over civilians when the courts were open. 77
Milligan involved a U.S. citizen who was arrested, tried before a mili-
tary commission and sentenced to death by hanging on charges of con-
spiracy during the Civil War period. 78 Milligan sought a writ of habeas
corpus arguing that, because he was a United States citizen and had never
been a resident of any State involved in the Rebellion, the military com-
mission did not have jurisdiction to try him. 79 In holding that Milligan's
detention was illegal, the Court emphasized the importance of the perma-
nence of inherent constitutional rights, even in exigent circumstances
such as war.80
The Court relied on a number of factors in holding that the military
did not have jurisdiction over Milligan.8 1 First, the Court stated that the
laws of war did not apply to Milligan because he was a citizen of a state
where the courts were open and unobstructed.8 2 Second, Milligan was not
a member of the armed forces, and therefore was not subject to military
law.8" Third, the Court noted that the area where Milligan was detained
was not a place of war, and therefore not subject to military jurisdiction. 8 4
75. See id. at 118 (holding that President could not detain civilian without
according him constitutional rights).
76. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
77. See id. at 324 (holding that military tribunals cannot supplant civilian
courts).
78. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107-08 (reviewing procedural history of case). Mil-
ligan was a resident of Indiana, a peaceful territory, and had never served in the
military. See id. at 107 (reviewing relevant facts of case). For the significance of
whether Milligan had served in the armed forces, see supra note 28.
79. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107-08 (stating Milligan's arguments and reasons
for pursuing writ of habeas corpus).
80. See id. at 120-21 ("The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protec-
tion all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.").
81. See id. at 121-22 (stating reasons for denial of military court's jurisdiction
over Milligan).
82. See id. at 121 ("[The laws of war] can never be applied to citizens in states
which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are
open and their process unobstructed."). The government argued that the power
of the military to assume a judicial role arose from the laws and usages of war. See
id. (describing government's contention that law of war applied to Milligan). In
Indiana, the state in which Milligan's arrest took place, the courts were open and
no rebellion was taking place. See id. (rejecting idea that law of war applied in
Indiana).
83. See id. at 121-22 ("[N]o usage of war could sanction a military trial there
for any offense whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise [sic] connected with the
military service."). For the significance of whether Milligan had served in the mili-
tary, see supra note 28.
84. See MUlligan, 71 U.S. at 122 (discussing Congress's power to establish
courts). The Court rejected the argument that martial law existed, emphasizing
that martial law may be required in places where there is an "actual and present"
necessity such that the courts are closed and the civil administration deposed, but
[Vol. 48: p. 875
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Finally, the Court noted that Congress had already provided a remedy
through legislative action that could bring Milligan before the courts . 5
The Court also rejected the government's argument that Milligan
could not challenge his detention.8 " The Court held that, although Con-
gress may suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times of rebellion, the
Court's role was to receive the petition, and decide whether the petitioner
may proceed with it.8 7
In Orozco, the military detained a man for violating neutrality laws
when he conducted an unauthorized military expedition to Mexico. 88
The man, however, had never been a member of the military.8 9 After de-
ciding that no martial law existed that would justify his detention, the
court held that the President could not order the arrest of individuals
without granting them their rights under the Constitution. 9" The court
made the following important statement regarding the President's power
to detain a person:
not in places where there is only a threat of invasion. See id. at 126-27 (rejecting
argument that martial law existed in Indiana at time of Milligan's arrest).
85. See id. at 122 (setting forth additional reasons for military tribunal's lack of
jurisdiction). The Court noted that if Milligan had in fact conspired against the
government, and if leaving him unrestrained was dangerous, there was a law in
place to confine him and prevent him from doing further harm. See id. (stressing
the availability of civil remedy for Milligan's actions).
86. See id. at 130-31 (rejecting government's argument that Milligan could not
challenge military's jurisdiction in civilian courts).
87. See id. (maintaining that Court could still decide on writ of habeas corpus
even when privilege of writ of habeas corpus had been suspended). The Court
wrote, "[t]he suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course; and on the return
made to it the court decides whether the party applying is denied the right of
proceeding any further with it." Id.
88. See Ex pane Orozco, 201 F. 106, 110-11 (1912) (stating facts of case).
89. See id. at 109 (noting that military laws are not at issue because Orozco was
never in military service).
90. See id. at 112 (limiting President's power to detain civilians). The Court
stated:
The power to arrest without warrant and to deprive the individual of his
liberty without due process of law has no existence in this country. It has
not been committed to any official, however high his station, nor to any
department of the government, either executive, legislative, or judicial.
Every department must act in obedience to the mandates of the Constitu-
tion. No one of them may usurp powers forbidden by that instrument,
and none of them may perform acts in violation of its commands. When,
therefore, an individual is arrested without warrant, in disregard of the
fourth amendment, and imprisoned without due process of law, in viola-
tion of the fifth, the arrest and imprisonment are unlawful, and cannot
be sustained in a court of justice .... His arrest upon the mere order of
the President was in contravention of the fourth amendment of the Con-
stitution, and his continued detention is repugnant not only to the fifth
amendment, but also to the sixth, which guarantees to the accused the
right to a speedy and public trial by a jury of the district where the crime
shall have been committed.
2003] NOTE
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[i]f a citizen can be arrested, except upon a charge of violated
law, and for the purpose of taking him before some judicial tribu-
nal for investigation, then it is plain that the executive depart-
ment has usurped the functions of the other two, and the whole
theory of our Government, so far as it related to the protection of
private rights, is overthrown.
9 1
Finally, in Duncan, the Court decided whether a civilian was subject to
military jurisdiction in the state of Hawaii, which was under martial law. 92
The Court followed its decision in Milligan, reasoning that to allow the
military to have jurisdiction over civilians when the courts are open is obvi-
ously contrary to the principles on which this country was founded. 93
The above cases demonstrate that the military may not exercise juris-
diction over civilians unless there is an immediate threat to the peace and
a clear obstruction to the proper functioning of the courts.94 As such,
these cases protect individual rights by setting important limits on govern-
ment, especially presidential, authority to act through the military.
2. World War II-Executive Orders for Race-Related Internment and Curfew,
and the Limits Imposed on the President's Power
During World War II, the principles espoused in cases such as Milli-
gan were ignored under the guise of emergency in time of war.95 Two
91. Id. at 116 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 147 (111. 1867)).
92. See Duncan v. Kahanamoko, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (holding that mili-
tary could not try civilians when civilian courts were open). The two petitioners in
Duncan were arrested for assaulting two marines in violation of a military order
and embezzling stock in violation of the laws of Hawaii. See id. at 307-11 (describ-
ing facts of case).
93. See id. at 317 ("[The] military trial of civilians charged with crime, espe-
cially when not made subject to judicial review, [is] so obviously contrary to our
political traditions and our institutions of jury trials in courts of law, that the tenu-
ous circumstance offered by the Government can hardly suffice to persuade us that
Congress was willing to enact [into statute, authorization] permitting such a radi-
cal departure from our steadfast beliefs.").
94. See id. at 324 (holding that citizen of Hawaii could not be tried by military
commission as long as civilian courts were functioning); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
2, 131 (1866) (holding that military may not try civilians when courts were open
and unobstructed); Orozco, 201 F. at 118 (holding that President could not arrest
someone without granting his or her constitutional rights).
95. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943) (justify-
ing encroachment on liberties of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent by govern-
ment's broad powers to wage war and protect public); Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115, 117 (1943) (justifying government actions in requiring curfew for citi-
zens of Japanese descent by deferring to broad constitutional power to prosecute
war even to extent it encroaches on individual liberties); Korematsu v. United
States, 140 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1943) (justifying forced internment of whole
families of Japanese descent as necessary in prosecution of war and necessary to
contain possible espionage), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Murphy described
the atmosphere of the times: "The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be
satisfied. But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of the boundless and
894 [Vol. 48: p. 875
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important cases, Hirabayashi v. United States"6 and Korematsu v. United
States,9 7 demonstrate the leniency that the courts provided to the govern-
ment during this dark moment in American history.98 Nevertheless, de-
spite the seemingly free hand the courts gave to the President in dealing
with U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during the war, a trilogy of cases
imposed limits on the President's power.99
In Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court considered the imprisonment of
an American citizen of Japanese descent who violated a curfew order. 1l °
The Court considered whether Congress or the President had any author-
ity to issue the curfew order and punish a violation under it.I", In answer-
dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned today." In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 28 (1946).
96. 320 U.S. 81 (1943); see also Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117 (sustaining conviction of
person of Japanese ancestry for violating curfew order).
97. 140 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1943), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
98. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 104-05 (upholding government's imprison-
ment of citizen ofJapanese descent for violating curfew order); Korematsu, 140 F.2d
at 290 (upholding imprisonment of citizen ofJapanese descent for violating presi-
dential order excluding Japanese from designated military area); see also Fletcher,
supra note 18 (calling Korematsu case part of "disgraceful episodes of World War 11
jurisprudence").
99. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944) (limiting circumstances
when government could infringe on individual liberties to those where there was
evidence of actual disloyalty); see also Scherzberg v. Madeira, 57 F. Supp. 42, 47
(E.D. Pa. 1944) (limiting government's justifications of national defense to situa-
tions where there was evidence of type of wrong-doing government was trying to
prevent); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (limiting govern-
ment's power to interfere with individual rights to those where there was immedi-
ate danger requiring use of military rather than civilian authorities).
100. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83 (stating issue of case). Hirabayashi was
convicted of a misdemeanor for violating restrictions made by the military pursu-
ant to a presidential order authorized by Congress. See id. (describing particulars
of arrest). An Act of Congress made the act of disregarding a military restriction a
misdemeanor. See id. (describing origin of law under which Hirabayashi was con-
victed). Additionally, a presidential order authorized military commanders to pre-
scribe military areas from which people could be excluded. See id. (describing
order authorizing designation of military areas). Pursuant to this order, the com-
manding general issued a series of proclamations, including the curfew order,
which designated time periods when alien Japanese, German, Italian and all peo-
ple of Japanese ancestry could not enter certain areas. See id. at 86-90 (reviewing
series of proclamations made by commanding general).
101. See id. at 87-88 (stating issues to be considered). The Act of Congress
stated:
That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any mili-
tary area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive
Order of the President ... contrary to the restrictions applicable to any
such area or zone . . .shall, if it appears that he knew or should have
known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that
his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id. (quoting Congressional Act of March 21, 1942). The subsequent executive or-
der stated, "'the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protec-
tion against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-
defense premises, and national-defense utilities . . . .'" Hirabayashi 320 U.S. at 85
(quoting Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)).
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ing this question, the Court found that the executive and legislative
branches had broad powers to wage war. 112 Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded that it was not any court's duty to review the executive and legisla-
tive branches' decisions regarding the war effort.1 1 3 In upholding the
order's validity, the Court stated that it was inevitable that an infringement
of some constitutional liberties would occur, and likened the orders to the
confinement of people in their homes during an air raid.10 4 The Court
upheld the curfew order, emphasizing the narrowness of its holding.10 5
In Korematsu, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the forced
internment of thousands of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent, based on a
presidential order. 106 In Korematsu, the U.S. government detained a citi-
zen of Japanese ancestry for the offense of remaining within a designated
military area that excluded Japanese-Americans. 117 The court of appeals
again advocated broad war powers, including those that temporarily in-
fringed upon inherent rights under the Constitution. 108 According to the
102. See Hirabayashi 320 U.S. at 92 (granting broad powers to President and
Congress to wage war). The Court concluded that "it was within the constitutional
power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe this
curfew order for the period under consideration and that its promulgation by the
military commander involved no unlawful delegation of legislative power." Id. at
92-93.
103. See id. at 93-94 (deferring to government's judgment during war based
on Constitution's grant of power).
104. See id. at 99 (stating that individual liberty may be constrained in times of
danger). The Court stated:
[I]f it was an appropriate exercise of the war power its validity is not im-
paired because it has restricted the citizen's liberty. Like every military
control of the population of a dangerous zone in war time, it necessarily
involves some infringement of individual liberty, just as does the police
establishment of fire lines during a fire, or the confinement of people to
their houses during an air raid alarm-neither of which could be thought
to be an infringement of constitutional right.
Id.
105. See id. at 102 (declaring that holding only pertains to specific facts of
case).
106. See Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1943) (up-
holding presidential order to intern citizens ofJapanese descent). The Court fol-
lowed the prior decisions of Hirabayashi and Yasui in which the Supreme Court
had sustained the validity of a curfew order, also made by the commanding gen-
eral. See id. at 289 (discussing Hirabayashi and Yasuz). Although the Supreme
Court in those decisions had not decided the validity of the evacuation order, the
Court here relied upon the rationale the Supreme Court used to uphold the cur-
few order. See id. at 290 (relying on Supreme Court rationale).
107. See id. at 289 (discussing facts of case). An exclusion order made by the
commanding general required exclusion and evacuation from these areas. See id.
(describing grounds for arrest).
108. See id. at 290 ("[U]nder the Constitution the government of the United
States, in prosecuting a war, has power to do all that is necessary to the successful
prosecution of a war although the exercise of those powers temporarily infringe
some of the inherent rights and liberties of individual citizens which are recog-
nized and guaranteed by the Constitution.").
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court of appeals, the exclusion order, like the curfew order in Hirabayashi,
was a necessary part of the war effort. 10 9
Despite the above cases, courts did impose some limits on the govern-
ment's power." I0 In Ex parte Endo,1 1' the Supreme Court held that the
detention of a woman of Japanese ancestry had no relationship to the ob-
jective of protecting the war effort against sabotage, and that without
proof of disloyalty she could no longer be detained.' 12 In Schueller v.
Drum,' 13 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the detention of a
U.S. citizen of German descent was illegal and that, barring situations of
impending and imminent danger, the President or Congress could not
abridge a person's constitutional guarantee of freedom.1 14 Finally, in
Scherzberg v. Madeira," 5 the same court held that the detention of a Ger-
man-born U.S. citizen who entered an area of exclusion was illegal be-
cause there was no rational basis for the exclusion order.' 16 For the
exclusion order, and therefore, the detention to be legal, there had to
have existed in the area an immediate danger to the welfare of the
country. "1
7
The foregoing discussion suggests limited situations in which the mili-
tary may detain civilians. The military may detain and try people when
martial law exists in such a way that the civilian courts are unavailable for
use.' 18 Military detentions and trials are also a valid temporary replace-
109. See id. (analogizing exclusion order to curfew order under Supreme
Court rationale).
110. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 295 (1944) (requiring showing of disloy-
alty to justify detention of woman of Japanese descent as relating to proper objec-
tive of protecting U.S. from sabotage and espionage); see also Scherzberg v.
Madeira, 57 F. Supp. 42, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (requiring evidence of actual activities
related to espionage and actual impending danger in general area to justify deten-
tion of German-born U.S. citizen); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 386 (E.D.
Pa. 1943) (requiring immediate and impending danger and inability of civilian
authorities to secure public safety tojustify exclusion order that abridges person's
liberties and freedoms).
111. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
112. See id. at 295 (holding that War Relocation Authority had no authority to
detain citizens not proven to be disloyal).
113. 51 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
114. See id. at 387 (limiting President's war power to situations of impending
and imminent danger).
1i5. 57 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
116. See id. at 46 (limiting power to designate military areas and criminalize
breach of those areas to situations where these actions had rational basis to possi-
ble danger).
117. See id. at 47 (requiring immediate danger tojustify exclusion of citizens).
118. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (upholding existence
of martial law); State ex rel. O'Connor v. Dist. Court in Shelby County, 260 N.W. 73,
84 (Iowa 1935) (upholding existence of martial law); In re McDonald, 143 P. 947,
954 (Mont. 1914) (holding that, during martial law, military may arrest and detain
people but may not punish them); see also Ex pane Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 13 (1866)
(describing conditions under which martial law applies).
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ment of a civilian justice system in areas of occupied territory.1 19 Finally,
military detentions and trials are a valid means of trying enemy belliger-
ents who enter U.S. soil during a war to engage in acts of sabotage or
violate the law of war on behalf of the enemy. 120 Absent these situations,
neither the President nor Congress may order the detention of a person in
contravention of their constitutional rights, unless the degree of exigency
in the area is such that there is an imminent or immediate danger threat-
ening the nation and the detention of that person has a rational basis in
combating that exigency.121
IV. Is PADILLA'S DETENTION VALID UNDER THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS?
MUST THE GOVERNMENT DEFEND HIS DETENTION?
The circumstances of Padilla's detention involve two questions. First,
whether his detention is legal under the historical precedent discussed
above, and second, whether Padilla may challenge his detention in a civil-
ian court, a question to which the government answers in the negative.'
22
Based on precedent, this Note argues that Padilla's detention by the mili-
tary is unlawful.' 23 Additionally, this Note suggests that even if his deten-
tion was lawful, he must be granted access to a lawyer and the right to
challenge his detention via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
124
A. Legality of Padilla's Detention Under Historical Precedent
In order to determine whether Padilla's detention is legal, it must be
tested under historical precedent. Thus, this section first tests Padilla's
detention under the principles of Quirin.125 Second, this section tests Pa-
119. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952) (upholding estab-
lishment of occupation court in Germany to try civilians for crimes under German
Criminal Code); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 (1909) (holding that be-
cause civil courts had not yet extended into occupied territory, military power war-
ranted creation of provisional court); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. 129, 133 (1869)
(holding that President could establish temporary provisional court to try cases
during war).
120. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (upholding sentence by mili-
tary tribunal of General Yamashita for war crimes); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 36
(1942) (upholding military trials of enemies entering U.S. territory to commit
sabotage). 1
121. For a survey of case law where the Court actually limited government
power to abridge individual rights during war, see su,#ra notes 71-94, 111-17 and
accompanying text.
122. See Grossman, supra note 21, at 96 (quoting United States government
brief filed in case against Padilla stating "'A court of the United States has no
jurisdiction ... to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties'").
123. See infra notes 125-65 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 36 (holding that U.S. citizens may be de-
tained and tried by military for plans to violate law of war on behalf of enemy).
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dilla's detention under the principles of Milligan and its progeny. 126 Fi-
nally, this section will test Padilla's detention under the general authority
of the President to order detention in times of war and exigency. 1
2 7
Padilla's situation is clearly distinguishable from the circumstances
present in Quirin. The first difference between Quiin and Padilla is that
Quirin was decided during a declared war.128 However, the absence of a
declaration of war has not prevented the U.S. in the past from entering
non-declared wars and conducting them under the law of war.' 2 9
There is some authority that supports the designation of the current
conflict as a war. First, Congress authorized the use of the armed forces in
ajoint Declaration. 131 Not only did the U.S. government view the conflict
as a war, but the international community embraced this conflict as a war
in unequivocal terms, never before invoked. 13 1
Nevertheless, there are problems with the designation of this conflict
as a war. These problems pertain to the detention of individuals as enemy
combatants whose detention may last until the cessation of hostilities.' 32
126. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 13 (1866) (holding that military
commission did not have proper jurisdiction to sentence prisoner without congres-
sional mandate); Exparte Orozco, 201 F. 106, 112 (W.D. Tex. 1912) (holding that
President could not arrest civilians without affording them their constitutional
rights).
127. See, e.g., Ex parteEndo, 323 U.S. 283, 295 (1944) (holding that detention
of Japanese woman did not relate to objective of protecting against sabotage and
espionage absent evidence of disloyalty); see also Scherzberg v. Madeira, 57 F. Supp.
42, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (holding that detention was improper because it was not
supported by rational basis); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 386 (E.D. Pa.
1943) (holding that there was no imminent danger to justify detention).
128. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20 (stating facts). Nevertheless, the law of war
applies even in the absence of a declared war. See Talbot v. Seemans, 5 U.S. 1, 28
(1801) (noting that law of war applies in partial wars).
129. See Goldman, supra note 15 (pointing out that World War II was last Con-
gressionally declared war but that U.S. has fought in other "wars" such as Vietnam,
Korea, Gulf War and Kosovo); Torruella, supra note 2, at 696 (pointing out that
other armed conflicts such as Vietnam, Korean and Gulf Wars were not declared
wars yet they were conducted under provisions of Geneva Conventions); see also
Talbot, 5 U.S. at 1 (holding that law of war applies in absence of declared war).
130. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing President to take all mea-
sures in combating terrorism, including force).
131. See Seelye & Bumiller, supra note 15, at A16 (quoting President Bush
saying that attacks "'were more than acts of terror; they were acts of war'"). For a
discussion of the factors that lend support to the conclusion that the armed con-
flict in Afghanistan is a war, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. The differ-
ence between the kind of war present in Quirin and the situation in the war on
terrorism creates many difficulties. See Dworkin, supra note 21 (arguing differ-
ences between Quirin and Padilla's case). Michael Schmitt, a former U.S. military
prosecutor, admitted that Padilla's case presents more complex questions than
were present in the Quirin case; these differences include questions of the nature
of the conflict, the start of the conflict and the end of the conflict. See id. (admit-
ting that Padilla's detention does not fit clearly within Quiin).
132. See Anthony Dworkin, Trial, Detention or Release? Introduction, May 17,
2002, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/detain-intro.html (stating difficulties
25
Pitts-Kiefer: Jose Padilla: Enemy Combatant or Common Criminal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW
The United States is not at war with a State or Nation, but against terror-
ism, an ideology. This ideology crosses over borders, including our own,
and does not always have a host nation whom the U.S. can attack and
defeat.' -" Furthermore, due to the nature of the enemy in a war against
terrorism, it will be difficult to assess when the conflict has ended.'
:
-
4
Thus, the danger is that Padilla's detention could be indefinite.1
3 5
A second factual difference derives from the Quiin Court's language
defining unlawful combatants.1 36 An unlawful combatant is one associ-
ated with the military arm of an enemy government, and directed by that
government to enter the country secretly to perform hostile acts or other-
wise act on its behalf.'13 7 The petitioners in Quirin were clearly members
of the enemy nation's army and acting on its behalf.'31 8 Their discarded
uniforms, the explosives and the other bomb making material retrieved
from them provided sufficient proof that they belonged to the enemy na-
tion and were deployed to carry out acts of sabotage.' 39
Additionally, the Quirin court used language connoting unlawful and
secret entry across enemy lines or into enemy territory.m411 The petitioners
in Quirin came into the country "surreptitiously" on a submarine.1 4 1 The
Quirin Court also referred to definite plans for sabotage, evidenced by the
abundance of explosive materials found on the Germans. 142
The evidence against Padilla pales in comparison. 43  There is no
proof that Padilla has participated in al-Qaeda training camps or actively
armed himself in alliance with the Taliban against American troops in the
with finding definite end for conflict against terrorism); see also Geneva-Prisoners
of War, supra note 30, art. 118 (providing for repatriation of prisoners of war at
cessation of hostilities).
133. See generally, Michael C. Bonatede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: As-
sessing the Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the
September 11 Attack, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 155 (2002) (discussing nature of interna-
tional terrorism and weighing American response).
134. See Dworkin, supra note 132 (discussing possible criteria for end of con-
flict against terrorism); Elliott, supra note 36 (stating that there is no guidance on
how to decide when hostilities are over). Asked to define the end of the conflict,
Donald Rtumsfeld stated "when we feel that there are not effective global terrorist
networks functioning in the world that these people would be likely to go back to
and begin again their terrorist activities." Dworkin, supra note 132.
135. See Elliott, supra note 36 (stating that on-going war on terrorism means
indefinite iinprisonment).
136. For pertinent language of the Quirin court, see supra note 58 and accom-
panying text.
137. SeeAxparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (defining unlawful combatant).
138. See id. at 20-22 (describing facts of case).
139. See id. (describing materials found on petitioners at time of arrest).
140. See id. at 30-31 (describing unlawful combatant as "[t]he spy who
secretly ... passes military lines of a belligerent in time of war").
141. See id. at 20-22 (describing petitioner's entry into U.S. territory).
142. See id. (describing evidence found on prisoners when arrested).
143. For differences between evidence found on petitioners in Quirin and
that found on Padilla, see infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
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war in Afghanistan.' 44 The evidence suggests, however, that had Padilla
succeeded in any bombing plot, he would not necessarily have been acting
under al-Qaeda's "aid, guidance or direction, in other words, he was not
necessarily acting on behalf of the enemy."' 45 Furthermore, Padilla did
not sneak into the country "surreptitiously." 14 6 Instead, he walked freely
and openly into the country at a large international airport.14 7 According
to government admissions, Padilla had no fixed plan and there is no evi-
dence that he had the means to build a radioactive bomb.
148
Finally, there is a difference in the type of military order given by
President Roosevelt in Quinin and the military order made by President
Bush in the aftermath of September 11. The Quirin Court relied heavily
on the presidential orders for the military's authority for detention. 149
President Bush's Order was largely drafted from President Roosevelt's Or-
der, with one important difference. 1 5 1 President Bush's Order expressly
excludes U.S. citizens from its jurisdiction. 15 1 Although President Bush
144. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20 (stating that in order to hold
Padilla as enemy combatant, relationship with al-Qaeda would not be enough, and
instead government would need to show nexus between his activities and armed
conflict in Afghanistan). The only evidence linking Padilla to either of these orga-
nizations is the testimony of a captured al-Qaeda member who met Padilla. See
Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (reporting how al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaydah told American officials he had met with Padilla). However, the reliabil-
ity of the informant is questionable. Additionally, Padilla could not have been
important to al-Qaeda if Abu Zubaydah was so willing to give him up. See Brune et
al., supra note 22, at A5 (stating that Padilla is not al-Qaeda insider).
145. See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (reporting lack of evidence
that al-Qaeda had embraced Padilla's plan). It is important to note that Padilla is
not acting for any army or government. Under international law, the law of war
only applies to state actors, not individuals. See Evans, supra note 2, at 1833 (argu-
ing that presidential order establishing military commissions is inconsistent with
international law). Terrorists, therefore, are not subject to punishment under the
law of war. See id. (stating that terrorists are not subject to law of war); see also
Goldman, supra note 36 (stating that terrorists captured in United States and not
sanctioned by state should be treated as common criminals).
146. See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22 (stating facts of Padilla's arrest in
Chicago).
147. See id. (same).
148. See Karen Branch, "Dirty Bomb" Plot in U.S. is Thwarted, Ashcroft Says; Man
Arrested May 8 at O'Hare is Placed in Militay Custody, ST. Louis PosT, June 11, 2002,
at Al (reporting that officials admitted there was no actual plan). See generally Bush
Calls, supra note 22 (reporting that officials said plot went only to planning stage
and there was no indication that Padilla had access to nuclear materials); Weiser &
Canedy, supra note 22 (reporting that law enforcement officer stated his doubt
whether Padilla had means to carry out plan or even had any fixed plan).
149. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22-23 (upholding President's power to
make order for military trials and relying on exact language of declaration).
150. See Evan J. Wallach, Prosecuting Al Qaeda September 11 and its Aftermath,
Dec. 21, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/al-wallach.html (stating sim-
ilarities between President Roosevelt's order and President Bush's order).
151. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Title 3, Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (authorizing detention of non-citizens found to have partic-
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could amend the Order, public opinion would probably not support that
decision, which is a likely reason why the President drafted the Order to
explicitly exclude Americans.1 52
A comparison of Padilla's detention with the detentions at issue in
Milligan and its progeny, however, illustrates that Padilla's situation is
more analogous to Milligan's than to the German saboteurs and, there-
fore, Padilla's detention, like Milligan's, is illegal. In Milligan, the Court
held invalid Milligan's detention by a military tribunal during the Civil
War.15 3 The reasons the Court gave for its decision were that Milligan was
a U.S. citizen, he had never been in the armed forces, he had never been a
resident in any of the States under Rebellion and the courts were open
and unobstructed.' 54 Additionally, the Court found that the existence of
an adequate judicial remedy under which to try Milligan precluded the
military from usurping this role. 155 Although the United States was cer-
tainly attacked, neither Illinois nor Chicago was facing an "actual and pre-
sent" necessity in such a way that the courts were closed and civil
administration had been deposed. 1
5 6
Padilla is a U.S. citizen, and, although Padilla has traveled to Afghani-
stan, there is no evidence of involvement with the armed forces or the
fighting there. 157 Additionally, if Padilla has in fact conspired against the
United States, there are adequate judicial remedies available under rele-
vant Anti-Terrorist Acts.'15 Under this comparison it seems that Padilla's
ipated in terrorist acts or associated with members of al-Qaeda and authorizing
trial by military commission).
152. See Dworkin, supra note 21 (stating that it is possible that President could
alter regulations by another presidential order); Liptak, supra note 25, at A18 (stat-
ing that Order likely excluded U.S. citizens based on assessment of what nation
would find "politically palatable").
153. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 2 (1866) (holding that military commis-
sion did not have authority to try and sentence criminal because there was no
congressional sanction). For a discussion on Milligan, see supra notes 78-87 and
accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Milligan, see supra notes 78-87
and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the factors leading the Court to strike down the de-
tention in Milligan, see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
156. For requirements of martial law, see supra note 28. One commentator
noted, "as rough as things get at O'Hare sometimes, it's not a combat zone out
there." Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast,June 12, 2002) (referencing com-
ment by news guest Doug Cassel).
157. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20 (stating that, in order to hold
Padilla as enemy combatant, relationship with al-Qaeda alone would not be
enough, and instead government would need to show nexus between his activities
and armed conflict in Afghanistan).
158. See Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339B, Pub. L. 101-
519, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990) (as amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(U.S.A. Patriot Act) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001)) (designating penalties for certain terrorist acts or conspiracies);
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003) (defining war crimes and providing for imprisonment,
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circumstances are analogous to Milligan's and therefore, under Milligan,
Padilla's detention is likely illegal. 159
The final ground argued in support of Padilla's detention is under
the President's war powers. 6  To rely on the Japanese internment cases
as precedent for Padilla's arrest would cause an outcry and is unlikely be-
cause it is widely recognized that they represent a dark period in American
legal history.1 6 1 Furthermore, cases such as Endo illustrate that a person
may not be detained in the absence of proof of disloyalty.1 62 The cases
discussed above required an immediate danger and a rational basis for the
person's detention. 163 It would be a stretch, in light of precedent, to sug-
gest that all of America is under immediate danger in such a way that any
person could be detained indefinitely without constitutional
protection.1
64
An examination of the principles in the cases described above demon-
strates the substantial weight of the argument that no civilian may be de-
tained by the military without very clear evidence he or she was acting on
behalf of the enemy. The government cannot easily rely on Quirin. The
petitioners' circumstances in Quirin differ significantly from Padilla's cir-
fine or death penalty). For an argument that the criminal justice system is an
inadequate and inappropriate forum to deal with terrorism, see SpencerJ. Crona
& Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal and
Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CmTy U. L. REV. 349, 354 (1996) (advocating
military tribunals for terrorists rather than trials in criminal justice system). One
author has argued that, since Congress has already enacted a statute declaring its
preference for criminal prosecution of acts of terrorism, the President may not
make a contradictory order. See Torruella, supra note 2, at 660 (stating that Presi-
dent's power is at its "lowest ebb" when it contradicts clear legislative preference).
Torruella based his argument on the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952). In that case, Justice Jackson laid out three levels of
presidential power, the lowest level being when Congress has acted to demonstrate
its preference and the President acts contrary to that preference. See id. at 637-38
(Jackson, J., concurring) (defining three levels of presidential power).
159. For a comparison of Milligan's and Padilla's situations, see supra notes
153-59 and accompanying text.
160. See Grossman, supra note 21, at 96 (quoting United States government
brief in Padilla's case stating, "'A court of the United States has no jurisdiction...
to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties'").
161. See Torruella, supra note 2, at 668 (calling cases approving of Japanese
internment "one of [the Supreme Court's] least glorious moments"). Interest-
ingly, forty years after World War 1I, the Hirabayashi case convictions were vacated
by the district court and Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for procedural
errors. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987) (af-
firming lower court's vacation of conviction for failure to report to Civil Control
Station and reversing lower court's failure to vacate conviction for violation of cur-
few order).
162. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 295 (1944) (requiring some evidence of
disloyalty relating to reasonable objective in prosecuting war).
163. For a survey of cases that limited rather than broadened government's
power to wage war, see supra notes 71-94, 110-17 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion why circumstances necessary to impose martial law are
not present in U.S., see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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cumstances.'" 5 Additionally, it is not practical to rely on cases upholding
Japanese internment due to their controversial nature.
B. Is Padilla Entitled to Judicial Review by the Civilian Courts?
Even if the government is entitled to detain Jose Padilla as an enemy
combatant, it does not have the right to forbidjudicial review of his deten-
tion.166 Reviewing the significant cases that pertain to Padilla's situation,
it is clear that courts will retain jurisdiction to decide the legality of a de-
tention. 167 Barring cases of enemy aliens caught outside of the courts'
jurisdictional territory, courts guard their duty to review the legality of mil-
itary detentions so as to balance a substantial deference to the President's
war-making powers with the civil liberties that the Constitution
guarantees. 168
165. For an examination of the differences between Quirin and Padilla's situa-
tion, see supra notes 128-52 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Douglas, members of the Quirin Court, later re-
nounced their decision calling it "not a happy precedent." See Warren Richey,
Military Trialfor U.S. Citizen?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,June 12, 2002, at I (report-
ing on later writings and interviews of Justices).
166. See, e.g., In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1,9 (1946) (noting that Court's job was
to consider legality of military commission); Ex pare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)
(rejecting argument that Court could not decide whether military commissions
overstepped constitutional boundaries); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 10 (1866)
(holding that Court would always have jurisdiction to determine whether those
subject to military trial were legally detained).
167. See, e.g., Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9 (emphasizing that purpose of Court was
to test legality of military commission's jurisdiction); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (re-
jecting proposition that Court could never consider whether military commissions
improperly exercised jurisdiction); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 10 (concluding that, despite
government's removal of right to habeas corpus, Court retained authority to re-
view constitutionality of military commission's jurisdiction). It is also interesting to
note that without the Court's ability to review the jurisdiction of the military in
these cases, these opinions could never have been written.
168. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) (holding that fed-
eral courts had no jurisdiction over enemy alien captured abroad); Coalition of
Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1050-51 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing petition
for writ of habeas corpus for al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Camp X-Ray in
Cuba), affd in part, rev'd in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215
F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that U.S. courts have nojurisdiction
over detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba). For the opinion that the detainees
held at the base in Cuba are within federal court jurisdiction, see Paust, Ad Hoc
Rules, supra note 2, at 681 (arguing that U.S. military base is part of U.S. jurisdic-
tion under international law); Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 18, at 23-26 (ex-
plaining that U.S. court decision denying habeas corpus review to detainees in
Cuba violates international law); Torruella, supra note 2, at 704 (indicating that
U.S. has sovereign power over base and has previously exercised criminal jurisdic-
tion over citizens and aliens on base). In times of war, habeas corpus is ajudicial
remedy for unlawful detention by the executive branch. See generally Rutherglen,
supra note 32 (discussing role of habeas corpus in military commissions). The pur-
pose of habeas corpus is to review the legality of detention, making it the sole
barrier between freedom and executive or military tyranny. See id. (stating impor-
tant purpose of habeas corpus proceedings in balance of power). The President
has no authorization to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and Congress may only
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In Milligan, the Court retained jurisdiction to consider a writ of
habeas corpus to determine whether the military commissions had juris-
diction to try Milligan.1 69 In Quifin, the case on which the current govern-
ment relies, the Court held that, despite the presidential proclamation's
suspension of court review, persons were not excluded from seeking court
review based on contentions that the Constitution forbade their deten-
tion. 17 0 In Yamashita, the Supreme Court considered General Yamashita's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus even though he was an enemy alien
captured outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts and there was strong
evidence that he had participated in war crimes.
17
'
More recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 172 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cautioned against forbidding court review
of Hamdi's detention. 173 The court stated that if it decided to dismiss the
case and forbid review, it would be "embracing a sweeping proposition-
namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen al-
leged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without
charges or counsel on the government's say-so."
174
suspend it when "in Cases of rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Despite this, President Lincoln did suspend the writ
during the civil war, but the legality of his action is disputed. See Paust, Courting
Illegality, supra note 18, at 21-22 (noting that Article I of Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to suspend habeas corpus); Rutherglen, supra note 32, at 397-404
(reviewing history of writ of habeas corpus).
169. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 131-32 ("The suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter
of course; and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party apply-
ing is denied the right of proceeding any further with it."). For a further discus-
sion on this issue in Milligan, see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
170. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25-26 (indicating that aliens could still petition
courts for review). For further discussion on this aspect of Quiin, see supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text.
171. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8-9 ("The courts may inquire whether the de-
tention complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner. If
the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their
action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong
decision on disputed facts."). For a further discussion of the Yamashita Court's
rationale, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
172. 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
173. See id. at 283 (rejecting government's argument to dismiss case from
courts).
174. Id. (electing not to discuss case). Hamdi's detention is more easily justi-
fied because he was captured on the battlefield and his designation as an enemy
combatant makes more sense. In fact, the court of appeals has since decided that
his detention is legal for this very reason. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 198 (9th Cir.Jan. 8, 2003) ("We shall, in fact, go no further in this case than
the specific context before us-that of the undisputed detention of a citizen dur-
ing a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by
the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces."). Unlike Hamdi, Pa-
dilla was detained on U.S. soil and is not connected to the battlefield. See id. ("We
have no occasion, for example, to address the designation as an enemy combatant
of an American citizen captured on American soil or the role that counsel might
play in such a proceeding [Padilla v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086 (S.D.N.Y.
20031 NOTE
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None of the above discussed cases afford any reason why Padilla
should not be able to present his arguments in a civilian court. The U.S.
government apprehended Padilla on U.S. soil, thus Padilla is unambigu-
ously within the jurisdiction of the civilian courts. 175 Additionally, the
above cases do not support the government's argument that the presi-
dent's power to detain a person is unchallengeable. In order to maintain
a system of checks and balances on the government, the courts must be
able to review the military's jurisdiction to detain Padilla.176
Nevertheless, despite what arguments the government may rely on to
justify Padilla's detention and its opposition to defending its position in
court, the government's arguments cannot stand up to its own contradic-
tory behavior in relation to other suspected terrorists.
V. INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF PRISONERS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
AND POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT
The position that Padilla's detention is illegal garners support when
looking at other detentions of suspected terrorists. There is a substantial
difference between the government's treatment of Padilla versus its treat-
ment ofJohn Walker Lindh, Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, as well
as other terrorists that have navigated the judicial system in the past and
other suspected terrorists who are now being charged. 177 This Part will
briefly point out the inconsistencies and then consider some of the gov-
ernment's possible arguments in justifying this treatment. 178 It will con-
Dec. 4, 2002) ].") (citations omitted); see also Adam Liptak et al., Civil Liberties Put to
the Test in U.S., TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 2002, at Al (noting that Padilla's case dif-
fers from Hamdi's because Hamdi was caught on battlefield whereas Padilla was
caught in U.S.); Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 2, at A19 (reporting Padilla's
arrest at airport in Chicago). Padilla, therefore, even more than Hamdi, should be
entitled to judicial review.
175. See Dworkin, supra note 21 (stating that because Padilla is held on U.S.
territory he is eligible to petition federal courts for writ of habeas corpus); Gum-
bel, supra note 6, at 2 (comparing Padilla to Guantanamo Bay prisoners who are
arguably outside jurisdiction of courts).
176. See Paust, Ad Hoc Rules, supra note 2, at 693-94 (advocating granting of
habeas review in situations of military detention in order to further democratic
principles).
177. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20 (pointing out discrepancy be-
tween so-called twentieth hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui and Padilla). The cases of
Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid are the most famous cases. For a discussion
of these cases, see supra note 20. Nevertheless, many more suspected al-Qaeda
members have recently been detained and have been charged under a federal
statute with providing material support to al-Qaeda. See Lichtblau, supra note 20,
at A2 (reporting that four U.S. citizens were arrested in Oregon and charged with
conspiring to provide material support and services to al-Qaeda and Taliban); She-
non, U.S. Says, supra note 20, at 2 (describing arrest of five U.S. citizens of Yemeni
descent for suspected links to al-Qaeda).
178. See infra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
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clude that none of the government's arguments justify treating Padilla
differently than any other suspected terrorist.
179
The first suspected terrorist is Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
arrested for visa violations prior to September 11, and who is widely be-
lieved to be the twentieth hijacker. 180 The second suspected terrorist is
Richard Reid, also known as "the shoe bomber," a British citizen arrested
after attempting to ignite an explosive hidden in his shoe during a trans-
Atlantic flight in December 2001.181 There is significant evidence linking
both of these men to al-Qaeda. 182 These two men are not American citi-
zens, yet they have had access to the courts, lawyers and the rights of due
process. 83 John Walker Lindh, an American citizen, was caught fighting
in Afghanistan. 184 He has not been detained indefinitely and has suc-
ceeded in receiving a twenty year sentence as part of a plea-bargain.' 8 5
One of the government's possible arguments for treating Padilla dif-
ferently is that holding a trial for Padilla or defending his detention in
court would involve a public dissemination of highly sensitive information,
posing a huge national security risk. 186 This is a legitimate concern.
There is no reason, however, why Padilla's case presents more of a con-
cern than that of John Walker Lindh, Zacarias Moussaoui or any other
terrorist that has been tried in a U.S. court. Traditionally, terrorists are
tried in federal courts under federal statutes, and the Classified Informa-
179. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
180. See Johnston, supra note 20, at Al (reviewing background of Moussaoui's
arrest and charges against him). Moussaoui is also defending himself in federal
court. See Shenon, Sept. 11, supra note 20, at A22 (describing Moussaoui's numer-
ous court filings).
181. See Cowell, supra note 20, at B5 (describing events leading to Reid's ar-
rest); Thomas, supra note 20, at 110-11 (chronicling events on plane when Reid
attempted to explode shoe-bomb).
182. See Cowell, supra note 20, at B5 (describing Reid as al-Qaeda operative);
Johnston, supra note 20, at Al (discussing link between Moussaoui and September
11 hijackers).
183. See Cowell, supra note 20, at B5 (providing scope of judicial proceedings
facing Reid); Shenon, Sept. 11, supra note 20, at A22 (describing Moussaoui's pro-
gress defending himself in court); Thomas, supra note 20, at 110 (noting that Reid
faces charges in courts).
184. See Seelye, Walker Is Returned, supra note 19, at A15 (reporting on Lindh's
capture and return to U.S.).
185. See Seelye, Regretful Lindh, supra note 19, at Al (reporting on twenty-year
sentence under plea agreement). For a discussion on Lindh, see supra note 19.
186. See Benson & Woods, supra note 6 (reporting on government's defense
of national security concerns); Ruth Wedgwood, Prosecuting Al Qaeda September 11
and its Aftermath, Dec. 7, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/al-wedg-
wood.html (stating that criminal prosecutions in federal district court do not ade-
quately safeguard intelligence and technically classified information); Weiser &
Canedy, supra note 22 (indicating that government does not want to produce in-
formation derived from intelligence sources).
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tion Protection Act (C.I.P.A.) 187 is asserted when needed to protect sensi-
tive information. '
88
A second possible reason why the government has kept Padilla in mili-
tary detention is that it may not have enough evidence against Padilla to
pursue a prosecution in the courts. 18 9 The strong evidentiary require-
ments in the civil courts may be a barrier to any meaningful conviction.190
There would be no guarantee that Padilla would go to prison for a long
period of time. Lack of evidence, however, is not a legitimate reason to
hold someone in a military base and deny them access to a lawyer. 19 1
A third reason that the government may want to detain Padilla in a
military base is because it has no intention of charging him, but wants the
more lenient methods of interrogation that military detention would pro-
vide. 192 Donald Rumsfeld has openly stated that the government wants
him for investigatory purposes only. 19- Nevertheless, detaining someone
187. 1980 Classified Information Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat.
2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 696, § 1-16 (2000)) as
amended by Pub. L. No. 106-567, tit. VI, § 607, 114 Stat. 2855 (2000) [hereinafter
C.l.P.A.].
188. See Goldstone, sunpr note 6 (stating that there are numerous ways to safe-
guard sensitive materials); Michael Ratner, Prosecuting Al Qaeda September I I and its
Aftermath, Dec. 13, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/al-ratner.html
(providing that in criminal prosecutions sensitive evidence can be protected by
C.I.P.A.). Ruth Wedgwood of Yale University argues that C.I.P.A.'s usefulness is
limited because no matter what safeguards are put to use, the proceedings are
always open and available to the public and the media. See Wedgwood, supra note
186 (discussing apprehension surrounding use of civilian courts).
189. See Liptak, supra note 25, at A18 (stating possibility that government may
not have enough evidence to charge Padilla); Ratner, supra note 188 (enunciating
belief by attorneys that administration fears it does not have sufficient evidence to
convict); Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (reporting opinion of law en-
forcement officer who spoke of lack of formalized plan and doubt that Padilla had
means to carry out plan).
190. See Adam Liptak, Accord Suggests U.S. Prefers to Avoid Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2002, at A14 (proposing that Lindh's case is bad for civil liberties because
government has learned it is easier to do things without due process); Stuart Tay-
lor Jr., Congress Must Set Rules for How We Lock up Potential Terrorists, LEGAL TIMES,
July 22, 2002, at 44 (stating that government had to drop some charges because of
lack of proof, but wanted higher penalty for Lindh than what it was likely to get).
191. See Liptak, supra note 25, at A18 (quoting Professor Koh of Yale Univer-
sity saying "'[l]ack of hard evidence ... [does] not strike me as [a] compelling
[reason] to label him an enemy combatant'").
192. See Benson & Woods, supra note 6 (reporting that Padilla can be held
and questioned in military detention in ways criminal justice system would not
allow); Ratner, supra note 188 (stating belief by attorneys that administration wants
access to information through use of torture, drugs or other improper means).
193. See Weiser & Canedy, supra note 22, at A24 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld
who said he was more interested in finding out what Padilla knows than trying him
in court). Again, the government argues that national security requires that it find
out as much as possible to ward off future attacks, and therefore interrogation, not
punishment, is the necessary response. See Bush Calls, supra note 22, at A1O (quot-
ing government officials who used national security and preventative measures to
justify Padilla's detention). Nevertheless, the Constitution was written to protect
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solely to "find out what they know" is not a legitimate argument under the
Constitution. 1
94
Finally, it is likely that the government transferred Padilla to a military
base because it could not hold him as a material witness any longer. 19 5
Soon after Padilla's initial arrest, a New York district court judge found it
illegal to hold people as material witnesses for grand jury investigations.' 96
Under this decision, the government would have either had to press
charges or release Padilla. 197 The government may have had insufficient
evidence to press charges. The government did not, however, want to re-
lease Padilla and decided instead to designate him an enemy combatant
and hold him indefinitely. 198
It is likely that every one of these considerations played a role in the
government's decision to hold Padilla in a military base. However, none
of these reasons are sympathetic, much less legally acceptable, especially in
light of the constitutional considerations afforded other suspected
terrorists.
people from this type of justification, where it is more attractive to illegally interro-
gate someone than protect his or her rights. See U.S. CONsTI. amend. IV (prohibit-
ing unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing due
process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing right to counsel).
194. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20 (quoting Kenneth Roth, Direc-
tor of Human Rights Watch, stating, "'the government's legitimate desire to obtain
information about terrorist threats does not entitle the president to assume unlim-
ited powers to place in military custody anyone he identifies as a terrorist"'). For
Donald Rumsfeld's comments, see supra note 26.
195. See Can We Keep Him? 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect's Confinement Raises Questions
About Balancing His Rights Against the Public's Safety, PLAIN DEALER, June 12, 2002, at
BIO (noting that transfer from material witness to military detention came soon
after ruling that material witnesses could not be held indefinitely); Liptak, supra
note 25, at AI8 (indicating that move to military detention may have been related
to decision by district court judge holding that material witnesses could not be
held indefinitely).
196. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Stipp. 2d 55, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(disallowing indefinite detention of witness in grand jury investigation). But see
Weiser, supra note 26, at B4 (reporting on district courtjudge's decision that mate-
rial witnesses could be detained for grand jury investigations). However, this case
was decided after Padilla was moved to military detention. Had this case been
decided before Padilla was arrested, he would likely still be in ordinary civilian
custody.
197. See Dworkin, supra note 21 (asserting that if government continued to
hold Padilla as material witness it would have been pressured to charge him or
release him).
198. See id. (stating that pressure on government to charge or release Padilla
may have influenced government's decision to detain him as enemy combatant).
For discussion on possible lack of evidence, see supra notes 189-91 and accompany-
ing text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, is currently detained at a military
base in South Carolina.' 9 9 The government argues that Padilla is an en-
emy combatant and thus has no right to a lawyer and no right to challenge
his detention in federal courts.
200
A civilian is subject to military detention only in very limited circum-
stances, usually requiring the existence of a war or an imminent danger
that obstructs the functions of civilian courts. 2011 Additionally, U.S. citi-
zens fighting on behalf of an enemy, or attempting to further the enemy's
war effort on U.S. soil, may be held as enemy combatants and tried by
military commissions. 202 The circumstances required for military deten-
tion do not currently exist, because there is no war on U.S. soil, no immi-
nent threat of a hostile takeover and the courts are open and
unobstructed.2
03
Padilla's detention is distinguishable from that of the petitioners in
Quirin.2° 4 Furthermore, even if the government is correct in detaining
Padilla, the government must defend its position in a federal court against
a challenge to the validity of Padilla's detention. 2115 That the government
has not indefinitely detained other suspected terrorists, against whom they
have much more evidence, supports the conclusion that Padilla's deten-
tion is invalid.2 06 In light of the above discussion, it is important for the
courts not to allow the government to randomly select citizens, detain
them indefinitely, claim they have no rights under the Constitution and
claim they have no right to challenge their detention in a court.
Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer
199. For a discussion on Padilla's arrest, see supra notes 21-27 and accompa-
nying text.
200. For a discussion on the government's argument, see supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
201. For limits on power to detain civilians, see supranotes 67-121 and accom-
panying text.
202. For a discussion of the government's authority to detain U.S. citizens as
enemy combatants for violating law of war, see supra notes 36-66 and accompany-
ing text.
203. For a discussion why circumstances necessary to impose martial law are
not present in U.S., see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
204. For the differences between Padilla's situation and the petitioners in
Quiin, see supra notes 128-52 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of why Padilla has the right to challenge his detention,
see supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
206. For a summary of the inconsistencies in the government's treatment of
suspected terrorists, see supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
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